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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tashina Marie Alley appeals from her convictions for conspiracy to
manufacture or deliver synthetic marijuana and conspiracy to deliver drug
paraphernalia.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Boise police conducted an investigation of the manufacturing and sales of
synthetic marijuana (called "spice" or "twizted potpourri") at the "Red Eye Hut"
and a related warehouse. (Tr., vol. II, p. 498, L. 8 - p. 556, L. 16; p. 574, L. 15 p. 684, L. 24; p. 720, L. 4 - p. 829, L. 11.) Tashina Alley admitted she was
knowingly involved in the manufacturing and sales. (Tr., vol. II, p. 830, L. 11 - p.
834, L. 9.)

The state charged her with conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or

possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, conspiracy to deliver or
possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, and destruction of evidence.
(R., pp. 30-34.)
Alley joined a motion to dismiss filed by co-defendant (and husband)
Morgan Alley.

(R., p. 69.)

The district court denied the motion to dismiss,

concluding that the chemical formulations of the synthetic marijuana the Alleys
were making and distributing were covered by the applicable statute.

(R., pp.

185-204.)
Alley also objected to giving instructions that mistake of law was not a
defense. (R., pp. 249-51, 277, 279-81; Tr., vol. Ill, p. 2107, L. 23 - p. 2128, L.
13; p. 2170, L. 17 - p. 2172, L. 15.) The court ultimately gave the standard
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instructions that mistake of fact is a defense but mistake of law is not a defense.
(R., p. 405.)
The case proceeded to jury trial (R., pp. 312-37), after which the jury
convicted Alley on both conspiracy counts, but hung on the destruction of
evidence count (R., pp. 435-37). Alley filed a timely notice of appeal from the
district court's entry of judgment on the two convictions.
56.)
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(R., pp. 445-47, 451-

ISSUES
Alley states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err by denying
dismiss?

Alley's motion to

2.

Did the district court err by instructing the jury that a mistake
of law was not a defense to conspiracy?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Alley failed to show any error in the denial of the motion to dismiss?

2.

Has Alley failed to demonstrate that mistake of law is an affirmative
defense to a conspiracy charge?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
Alley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of The Motion To Dismiss

A

Introduction
The district court concluded the basis for the motion to dismiss was that

"the Indictment does not state a crime" because "AM-2201 is not illegal" and,
alternatively, that the statute is "unconstitutionally vague as applied" because of
the "ambiguity" of whether AM-2201 was a controlled substance.

(R., p. 185.)

The district court noted that the pleadings did not specify the chemical
formulation of the synthetic marijuana in question, but the evidence against the
defendants was that they were making their synthetic marijuana using three
different chemical formulations, to wit: AM-2201, JWM-019 and JWM-210. (R., p.
186. 1 ) The district court first concluded that AM-2201 was a synthetic marijuana
within the scope of the statute. (R., pp. 186-96.) It then concluded the statute
was not unconstitutionally vague. (R., pp. 196-203.)
Alley contends the court erred by finding that synthetic marijuana made
from AM-2201 is within the scope of the relevant controlled substances statute.
(Appellant's brief, p. 6 and appendices.) Because the conspiracy involved three
formulations of synthetic marijuana, two of which are admittedly illegal, Alley's
claim that the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss fails because it
is moot. In addition, the district court correctly concluded that AM-2201 is within
the scope of the definition of synthetic marijuana in the relevant statute.

"JWM-019" and "JWM-210" appear to be typos. The actual names for the
synthetic cannabinoid formulas are JWH-019 and JWH-210.
1
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B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

Alley's Challenge To The Denial Of The Motion To Dismiss Is Moot
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial

controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief."

State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). "A case is
moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have
no practical effect upon the outcome." In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337,340, 179 P.3d
300, 303 (2008) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County Comm'rs, 133
Idaho 851, 853, 993 P .2d 614, 616 (2000)). The mootness doctrine precludes
review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome " Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho
State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,432,816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)).
Alley "acknowledges that a determination that AM-2201 was not criminal
would not necessarily result in a complete dismissal of the charges." (Appellant's
brief, p. 6.) However, a complete dismissal was what was sought by the motion
and denied by the district court. Her admission that she was not entitled to the
relief she sought below makes the challenge to the district court's ruling on the
motion moot.
5

Alley argues that she would have had a mistake of fact defense at the trial

if AM-2201 was not within the scope of the statute {Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7), but
cites to nowhere in the record that this was the issue she presented or the relief
she sought. Moreover, she cites to nothing in the record indicating that she was
mistaken about the specific chemical formulation used to make the synthetic
marijuana.

(Appellant's brief, p. 6 (citing only to her husband, Morgan Alley's,

understanding of what chemical formulation he used in the production process).)
Morgan Alley testified he told others that the synthetic marijuana was legal, but
did not testify that he told them the specific chemical formulation of the synthetic
THC he thought he was using. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1424, Ls. 20-23; p. 1483, L. 12 p. 1484, L. 4.)

Alley never claimed below to have a mistake of fact defense

based on a mistaken understanding of which specific chemical formulation the
conspirators used to make the synthetic marijuana. Her attempt to assert one for
the first time on appeal, without any evidentiary foundation, does not render the
denial of her motion to dismiss justiciable on appeal.

D.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Plain Language Of The Statute
Even if the merits of the argument are reached, Alley has shown no error.

"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute, which
are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven, 154 Idaho
661, _ , 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation omitted). If
the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative history and other
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
6

Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ). In this case the statutory
language plainly expresses legislative intent to ban all synthetic THC.
The statute in question, I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011), 2 included in
Schedule I, as hallucinogenic controlled substances, tetrahydrocannabinols
('THC") or synthetic equivalents and "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their
isomers with similar chemical structure such as ... [a]ny compound structurally
derived from

3-( 1-naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane by

substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl .... "

I.C. § 37-

2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011 ). In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 meets all
the terms of this statute ("synthetic substance," "similar chemical structure" to
synthetic

THC,

"derived

from

3-(1-naphthoyl)indole

or

1H-indol-3-yl-( 1-

naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring") except
whether the substitution is by "alkyl." (R., pp. 188-96.) Alley's contention is that
there is no "substitution . . . by alkyl" because the "substitution at the nitrogen
atom of the indole ring" is by alkyl halide, which is different from the alkyl group
because it has a fluorine atom.

(R., pp. 188-96.)

The district court properly

concluded that Schedule I included all synthetic THC, and therefore the chemical
distinction claimed by Alley, which was not claimed to render AM-2201
something other than a synthetic THC, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I.

As determined by the district court, the language of the statute that
"synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure such as" the formulations

The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2012 amendment is currently in
effect. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2012).
2
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of synthetic THC found in subsection ii, plainly states that the formulations are
representative and not exclusive. (R., pp. 188-96.) Thus, the difference of one
atom (fluorine instead of hydrogen) between AM-2201 and the chemical
formulation given as representative of synthetic THC did not render AM-2201
outside the scope of the statute making illegal synthetic substances with similar
chemical structure part of Schedule 1. 3
Alley first argues the district court reached its decision "by resorting to
legislative history."

(Appellant's brief, Appendix A, p. 10.)

This argument is

apparently based on the assumption that "plain language" analysis and
determination of legislative intent are mutually exclusive.

(Id.)

Besides being

illogical, the argument that legislative intent is not gleaned from the language
used in a statute is without basis in law. Leavitt, 154 Idaho at_, 302 P.3d at 7
("When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute, which
are the best guide to determining legislative intent." (internal quotes, brackets
and citation omitted)); Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (plain language
of a statute is the "intent of the legislature"). The district court clearly relied on
the plain language of the statute to determine that AM-2201 is within the scope of
Schedule I, and referenced legislative history only as ultimately supporting the
conclusion already reached under the plain language analysis. (Compare R., pp.

The state on appeal, as in the trial court, contends that AM-2201 is in fact within
the representative formulation provided in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011).
(See, sLll:., R., p. 191.) However, because the district court did not resolve the
issue on this basis, but instead correctly held that the chemical formulations in
the statute are merely representative and the real question is whether the
synthetic has "similar chemical structure" to synthetic THC, this issue is not
before this Court for resolution.
3
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188-95 (plain language analysis) with

, p. 195-96 (mentioning legislative

statement of purpose and committee minutes only after reaching conclusion
based on analysis of the language of statute).) Alley's argument is unsupported
by the record.
Alley also argues that the district court should have "account[ed] for the
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and
extreme focus on structure."

(Appellant's brief, Appendix A, pp. 10-12.)

However, it is the plain language of the statute that controls, and that plain
language brings synthetic marijuana with "similar chemical structure" to synthetic
THC (such as AM-2201) within the prohibition of Schedule I, not just the chemical
formulations enumerated after the phrase "such as." (R., pp. 188-96.) Even if
this Court were to consider the proffer of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent it
does not show error.

Before the amendment a synthetic marijuana was within

the scope of Schedule I only if it had both "similar chemical structure and
pharmacological activity" of synthetic THC. See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 47,
§ 1, p. 111 (emphasis added).

The amendment eliminated the element of

"pharmacological activity." Id. That the state had one less element to prove did
not narrow the statute, as apparently claimed by Alley; it in fact broadened it.
The elimination of this portion of the statute in no way informs the inquiry into
whether AM-2201 is within the scope of Schedule I.
Alley next argues that the district court should have accepted the defense
expert's testimony that AM-2201 "is in a different 'class'" than the compounds

9

listed in subsection (ii)(a). (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, p. 16.) Alley has failed
to show that this testimony demonstrates any error by the district court.
Dr. McDougal testified about a "portion of the molecule," specifically, a
"five-carbon chain" located "off the nitrogen ring." (3/12/12 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 4-8. 4)
Because that chain ended with a "halogen fluorine atom" the chain was "an alkyl
halide" and not an "alkyl group," which is composed only of "carbon and
hydrogen." (3/12/12 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 6-24.) Once an atom such as the halogen
fluorine is added, the compound is removed from the "alkyl group" and it
"becomes a different class of compound." (3/12/12 Tr., p. 39, L. 23 - p. 41, L.
23.) The district court specifically considered this testimony. (R., p. 191.) The
court first rejected the testimony by noting that the legislature did not use the
phrase "alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" but just "alkyl." (R., p. 192). Focusing on
whether the carbon chain at issue was an "alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" "ignor[es]
the language chosen by the legislature." (R., p. 192.) The district court also
rejected Dr. McDougal's testimony distinguishing alkyl halides from alkyl groups
because it related only to "a select portion" of the statute "rather than reading it
as a whole."

(R., p. 193.)

Ultimately, because AM-2201 is a synthetic THC,

synthetic marijuana made with it fell within Schedule I. (R., pp. 193-96.)
Alley has failed to show error. Dr. McDougal did not testify that AM-2201

was in a different "class" than synthetic substances with "similar" chemical
structure "such as" certain formulations of synthetic THC (the relevant part of the

References to the "3/12/12 Tr." include the proceedings of 3/12/12, 3/14/12 and
6/12/12.
4
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statute as determined by the district court). He testified that a part of the atom, a
carbon chain, was an "alkyl halide" and not an "alkyl group" and assumed that
the legislative use of the word "alkyl" meant to include the latter and exclude the
former.

The district court properly rejected the argument that this testimony

demonstrated that AM-2201 fell outside the proscription of synthetic THC in
Schedule I.
Alley next argues that the examples of synthetic drugs in subsection (ii)(a)
contain only chains of carbon and hydrogen, and therefore any synthetic drug
with an atom other than carbon or hydrogen must be excluded as inconsistent
with the examples. (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, pp. 16-18.) The district court
concluded this argument "misses the point" because it, again, looks at only a
very limited part of the statute. (R., p. 193.)

Alley's argument would essentially

make the list exclusive, when the plain language shows the opposite intent (R.,
pp. 193-96), and even Alley acknowledges that the list is "non-exhaustive"
(Appellant's brief, Appendix A, p. 13).
Finally, Alley invokes the rule of lenity. (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, pp.
18-19.)

"[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure,

history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature]
intended."

Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 373, _ , 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09

(2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The mere "grammatical
possibility of a defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule
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of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible
reading of the [legislative] purpose." Abbott v. United States, _

U.S. _ , 131

S.Ct 18, 31 n.9 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). Alley has failed

to

show any

ambiguity in the statute, much less an ambiguity rising to the level of requiring
application of the rule of lenity.
The district court engaged in a thorough, thoughtful and correct analysis of
the plain language of the statute and concluded that AM-2201 was within the
scope of Schedule I.

Even accepting the defense claim that AM-2201 is one

atom different than the representative chemical formulation in subsection (ii)(a),
such does not show that AM-2201 is not a "synthetic substance" with "similar
chemical structure such as" the chemical formulations of synthetic THC provided
in the statute. The district court correctly concluded that the plain language of
the statute did not provide the chemical formulations as an exclusive list but
instead as representative of the types of chemical formulations of synthetic
marijuana prohibited.

(R., pp. 188-96.)

The plain language of the statute

prohibited the synthetic THC known as AM-2201.

11.
Mistake Of Law Is Not A Defense To The Conspiracy Charges
A.

Introduction
At trial the district court gave the approved jury instruction that mistake of

law is not a defense.

(R., p. 405; compare ICJI 1511.) Alley asserts that the

instruction was error, arguing it is not enough that she entered a conspiracy with
an objectively illegal goal, but that the state had to prove that the goal of the
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conspiracy was subjectively illegal as well.

(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)

This

argument fails because mistake of law is not a defense in Idaho.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Thompson, 140

Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,

94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). Whether a jury was properly instructed is a
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v.

Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v.
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)).

C.

Ignorance Or Mistake Of Law Is Not A Defense To Conspiracy In Idaho
It is a "deeply rooted" principle of American legal jurisprudence that

"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution."
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991 ); see also State v. Fox, 124
Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) ("Ignorance of the law is not a
defense." (citations omitted)); see also LC. § 18-101 (1 ), (5). An exception to this
rule exists in limited circumstances when the claimed mistake "negatives the
existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged." 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.6(a) (2d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted). But unless a
criminal statute contains "specific language to the contrary, ignorance of a law is
not a defense to a charge of its violation." Morgan v. Hale, 584 P.2d 512, 517
(Cal. 1978), quoted in Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; see also United
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States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (unless crime requires proof
of knowledge of law, "prosecution need not show that a defendant knew the
illegality of the conduct with which he is charged"); United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d
639, 643 (10 th Cir. 1995) (absent a clear statutory directive to the contrary, even
specific intent crimes "do not, as a rule, necessitate a showing the defendant
intentionally violated a known legal duty").

Idaho's conspiracy statutes contain

no language, much less specific language, indicating that ignorance of the law
would disprove guilt.
The state charged Alley under both the general conspiracy statute, I.C. §
18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
I.C. § 37-2732(f).

(R., p. 30.)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal

conspiracy is defined as follows:
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho,
and one ( 1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the
object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable
upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is
provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of
the crime or offenses that each combined to commit
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly
provides:
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons
shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, which may
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense,
the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
I.C. § 37-2732(f).
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Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty of
conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an illegal act and at
least one of the conspirators does some act in furtherance of the illegal
objective. 5 Consistent with this plain reading of the statutes, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has repeatedly stated that a conspiracy under Idaho law consists of
three essential elements: "(1) the existence of an agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective, (2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the
illegal purpose and (3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying
substantive offense." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct.
App. 1990)); accord State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, _ , 307 P.3d 1247,
1251-52 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 201 P.3d 657, 663
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct.
App. 2004); State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461,466,745 P.2d 1082, 1087 (Ct. App.
1987). See also ICJI 1101 (intent element of conspiracy is "that the crime would
be committed" (bracketed language omitted).) While the state must prove as an
element of a conspiracy charge that the defendant had the requisite intent to
commit the underlying offense, nowhere in the conspiracy statutes or in the case
law interpreting them is there an.y requirement that the state also prove the

defendant intended to violate the law or knew of the illegality of the agreed-upon

There is no language in I.C. § 37-2732(f) requiring an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Nevertheless, because the state also charged Alley under I.C. § 181701, it is undisputed that an act in furtherance was an element of the conspiracy
as charged.
5
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act.

In other words, intent to break the law or knowledge that a law will be

broken is simply not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law.
Rather than examining the plain language of the charging statutes, Alley
relies on decisions by Arizona and California courts holding that conspiracy is a
specific intent crime, and specific intent includes intent to violate the law.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) Although "[i]t is generally accepted that conspiracy
is a specific intent crime," Tankovich, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 1252; Rolon,
146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664, "specific intent" does not usually, much less
necessarily, mean intent to violate the law, see I.C. § 18-101 (5) ("knowingly"
does not "require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act"); Blair, 54 F.3d
at 643 (quoting United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990)) ("[A]
specific intent crime 'normally does not necessitate proof that the defendant was
specifically aware of the law penalizing his conduct."'). As explained by the Court
of Appeals in Rolon, the specific intent required for a conspiracy conviction is "the
intent to agree or conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the
object of the conspiracy." Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664 (emphasis
original); accord Tankovich, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 1251-52. As already
established, in this case mistake or ignorance of the law does not negate intent
to commit the underlying offenses. See,~' Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at
183 (intent required for possession of controlled substance is only "the
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance"). Likewise, ignorance or
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mistake of law does not negate the intent to agree or conspire to commit the
underlying offenses. 6
In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975), the Supreme Court of
the United States rejected Feola's argument that, on a charge of conspiracy to
assault federal officers in the performance of their duties, the prosecution was
required to "show a degree of criminal intent ... greater than is necessary to
convict for the substantive offense." Like Idaho's conspiracy statutes, the federal
statute at issue in Feola provided in relevant part that a criminal conspiracy is
committed when "two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against
the United States, ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy."
371 )).

Feola, 420 U.S. at 687 n.20 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §

Upon examination of that statute, the Supreme Court found "no textual

support for the proposition that to be guilty of conspiracy a defendant in effect
must have known that his conduct violated federal law."

kl

at 687. The Court

reasoned:
The statute makes it unlawful simply to 'conspire ... to commit any
offense against the United States.' A natural reading of these
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply
by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the
prohibited acts.

In this regard, the specific intent associated with conspiracy is similar to the
specific intent to commit burglary (intent to commit a theft or felony) see State v.
Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 343, 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. App. 2010), forgery
(intent to defraud), State v. McAbee, 130 Idaho 517, 519, 943 P.2d 1237, 1239
(Ct. App. 1997), or possession with intent to deliver, State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho
700, 705-06, 889 P.2d 729, 734-35 (Ct. App. 1994) (intent to deliver).
Undersigned counsel is unaware of any authority indicating that ignorance or
mistake of law would be defenses to these crimes merely because they require a
finding of specific intent.
6
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(ellipses original). The Court also pointed to its prior decisions in In re Coy,
127 U.S. 731 (1888), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), noting
that in both cases the Court "declined to require a greater degree of intent for
conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive
offense." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687-88.
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that, absent an
express statutory directive to the contrary, the intent required to sustain a
conspiracy conviction is merely that required for commission of the underlying
substantive crime. See, ~ . United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 340 (5 th Cir.
2012) (on charge of conspiracy to commit illegal gambling, government was
required to prove same degree of criminal intent as required for proof of
underlying substantive offense); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9 th
Cir. 1995) (where substantive offenses did not require proof of intent to violate
the law, defendants could be guilty of conspiring to commit substantive offenses
even if they were not aware their actions were illegal); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643
("prosecution need not prove a defendant intentionally violates a known legal
duty in order to sustain a conviction under [general federal conspiracy statute] in
cases where the underlying substantive offense does not impose such a
requirement"); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding
"no reason to believe ... from the words of the statute or from general criminal
law doctrine, that the quantum of mens rea required for a RICO conspiracy
should be different from or greater than that required for a substantive RICO
offense"); People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d 1076 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., 1952) ("The
18

guilt of those who conspire to do an act which is prohibited by law is measured
by their intent with reference to the act to be performed and not by the amount of
their knowledge or ignorance of whether such acts are contrary to statute.").
Like the conspiracy statutes at issue in the above-cited cases, the statutes
under which Alley was charged offer "no textual support" for the conclusion that
"intent to violate the law" is a necessary element of conspiracy. As in Feola, the
statutes at issue in this case make it unlawful simply to "conspire to commit any
crime or offense prescribed by the laws" of this state, I.C. § 18-1701, or to
"conspire to commit any offense defined in" the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). Also as in Feola, "[aJ natural reading of these words would
be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging in the
forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense is nothing more than an
agreement to engage in the prohibited act." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687. Accordingly,
as in Feola and the other cases cited, the state need not prove an intent to
violate the law to sustain a conspiracy conviction, unless such intent is required
for commission of the underlying substantive crime.

Because the Uniform

Controlled Substance Act violations that were the objects of the charged
conspiracies in this case did not require knowledge of the illegality or intent to
violate the law, see I.C. §§ 37-2732(a), 37-2734B; Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866
P.2d 183, Alley was guilty of conspiracy merely by having the specific intent to
commit the proscribed acts (i.e., the delivery or possession with intent to deliver
synthetic cannabinoids and paraphernalia, respectively), regardless of her
knowledge or lack thereof that the acts were illegal.
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Idaho's conspiracy statutes, by their plain language, do not require as an
element either knowledge that

object of the conspiracy is illegal or intent to

violate the law. Nor do the crimes that were the objects of the conspiracies in
this case require knowledge they were proscribed by law. Because neither the
conspiracy statutes nor the substantive criminal statutes under which Alley was
charged require any specific intent to violate the law, Alley's alleged ignorance or
mistake of law was not a defense to the charged conspiracies.

Alley has

therefore failed to show error in the jury instruction that mistake of law was not a
defense to her crimes.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment.
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